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Abstract
We study repeated implementation in a model with overlapping generations of 
agents. A social choice function selects an alternative in each period as a function 
of preferences of those agents who are alive in that period. When the agents’ 
preferences do not change during their lifetime, we show that any social choice 
function satisfying a mild unanimity condition is repeatedly implementable 
in subgame perfect equilibrium if there are at least three agents and they live 
sufficiently long. When the agents’ preferences change every period, we show that 
only efficient social choice functions can be repeatedly implementable if the agents 
live sufficiently long.
1 Introduction
Implementation theory studies what goals a social designer can achieve when 
agents possess more information than the designer and they try strategically to 
benefit from it. So far, the literature has mostly focused on one-shot implementation, 
while the existing work on repeated implementation has assumed that the same 
agents are alive in all periods. However, the current debate about environmental 
protection, sustainable development or pension reform often involves arguments 
about intergenerational equity. To study whether intergenerational equity can be 
achieved, we need a setup that explicitly allows for different generations of agents. 
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Or said differently, once we introduce different generations, it gives rise to novel 
normative issues1 and we may want to know if these norms can be achieved when 
agents behave strategically. Therefore, our goal is to study what can or cannot be 
implemented in a setup with different generations of agents.
We now outline the model. Every period there are n agents alive and these agents 
belong to different generations, that is, they have different ages. Every T periods 
the oldest agent dies and a new agent is born. Thus, each agent lives exactly for nT 
periods. Agents’ preferences are additively separable over time and the current period 
preferences of agent depend on his type. The objective of designer is captured by a 
social choice function (SCF), which specifies a socially desirable alternative for every 
period as a function of types of those agents who are alive in that period. Because the 
designer never observes agents’ types, she needs to design a sequence of mechanisms, 
called a regime, that allows her to elicit this information and, at the same time, to select 
the desired alternative in every period on the equilibrium path. If there exists such a 
regime, we say that the SCF is repeatedly implementable. Our goal is to characterize 
the SCFs that are repeatedly implementable. We assume complete information among 
agents and use subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) as our solution concept.
We model generations similar to how it is done in the literature on repeated 
games played by overlapping generations (OLG) of players. For example, Cremer 
(1986) studies the possibilities of cooperation among players in such games when 
T = 1 , while Salant (1991), Kandori (1992) and Smith (1992) derive folk theorems 
by allowing T to be large. The only difference with the current model is that in these 
papers, it is assumed that when an agent dies, he is replaced with his exact copy.
The OLG setup can be applied in many contexts. As mentioned, we can study 
whether intergenerational equity is achievable in the context of sustainable 
development or pension reform. Cremer (1986) and Kandori (1992) argue that 
the OLG games provide a natural theory of organizations. For example, different 
workers join and leave a firm at different times, which helps to sustain cooperation 
among them. From the perspective of implementation theory, we can ask what goals 
a manager can achieve if she is less informed than the workers. The US Senate is 
another example of institution that neatly fits the OLG framework: senators serve 
a six years’ term and every two years, one third of them is reelected. Alternatively, 
we can think that there are n different institutions (firms, countries) that are run 
by individuals (managers, heads of state) and, more often than not, individuals of 
different institutions are replaced at different times.
We study repeated implementation of SCFs under two opposite assumptions 
about the agents’ types: when the agents’ types do not change during their lifetime 
and when new types are drawn every period. Under the former assumption, we 
obtain the following results. We first show that any SCF that is repeatedly imple-
mentable, must satisfy a mild condition, which we call OLG-unanimity. It states 
that if all agents, no matter what their types are, agree on the best alternative and 
1 For example, Shinotsuka et  al. (2007) formulate three different notions of envy-freeness in a model 
with overlapping generations: No-Envy in Overlapping Consumptions, No-Envy in Lifetime Consump-
tions, and Equity in Lifetime Rate of Return. The first two notions would coincide in a static setup, while 
the last notion does not have an analogue in a static setup.
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if by lying, they can obtain this alternative in every period, then the SCF must be a 
constant function that always selects this alternative. Intuitively, it is impossible to 
incentivize the agents to reveal their true types because they already get their highest 
possible lifetime payoff.
Next, we construct a regime and show that any SCF that satisfies OLG-unanim-
ity, is repeatedly implementable if there are at least three agents, n ≥ 3 , and they live 
long enough, namely, T ≥ 3 . Because agents’ types do not change during their life-
time, a lie about their types does not need to be challenged immediately, but it can 
also be done by next generations. Also, OLG-unanimity condition implies that if an 
SCF is not a constant function,2 then there exists an agent who does not expect his 
highest possible lifetime payoff. This agent can always be incentivized to challenge 
the lie of other agents. This allows us to obtain very permissible results in terms of 
SCFs that are implementable. The regime that is used to prove the sufficiency result, 
borrows elements of the canonical mechanism that is used in one-shot implementa-
tion in SPE (Moore and Repullo 1988; Abreu and Sen 1990; Vartiainen 2007). We 
will elaborate on the connection to one-shot implementation in SPE in Sect. 3.1.
The results are different when the agents’ types are drawn anew every period. 
We show now that if an SCF is not generation-efficient in the range, then it is not 
repeatedly implementable when T is large. Generation-efficiency in the range 
extends the concept of efficiency in the range that was introduced by Lee and 
Sabourian (2011), to the OLG setup. It requires that there does not exist an SCF 
whose range is contained in the range of the SCF that is being implemented, but 
which gives higher expected payoff to every agent. The intuition for the result is as 
follows. If an SCF is not generation-efficient in the range, then by lying, the agents 
can obtain higher payoffs. Also, because types now change every period, any lie 
must be challenged and tested immediately. This, however, imposes a limit on the 
size of reward that the agent who challenges, can receive (otherwise he will also 
challenge when the others are not lying). Finally, for large enough T, the gains 
from sticking to the lie will exceed this reward. To show this result, we build on the 
aforementioned papers that prove folk theorems for OLG games and, specifically, on 
Smith (1992).
Repeated implementation has been studied by Kalai and Ledyard (1998), 
Chambers (2004), Lee and Sabourian (2011), Mezzetti and Renou (2017) and 
Azacis and Vida (2019).3 However, in all these papers, the same set of agents is alive 
in all periods. Thus, these papers do not consider the implementation of SCFs that 
can capture any intergenerational social choice considerations. Further, Kalai and 
Ledyard (1998) and Chambers (2004) assume that the state of the world is drawn 
only once and is kept fixed for all periods. Hence, their setup corresponds to the case 
in our model when the type of agent is kept fixed throughout his lifetime. Like us, 
they obtain very permissible results. On the other hand, Lee and Sabourian (2011); 
Mezzetti and Renou (2017); Azacis and Vida (2019) assume that in a model with 
2 A constant SCF is trivially implementable.
3 Hayashi and Lombardi (2019) also study implementation in a dynamic setup, but in any given period, 
the socially desirable alternative depends not only on the state, but also on the history of alternatives that 
have been selected in the previous periods.
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discounting, a new state is drawn in each period. While the last two papers study 
what can be implemented for a given discount factor, Lee and Sabourian (2011) 
show that only SCFs that are efficient in the range, can be repeatedly implementable 
when the discount factor is sufficiently high. Thus, we provide a counterpart to their 
result in the OLG setup.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formally describes the 
model. Section 3 deals with the case when the agents’ types do not change during 
their lifetime, while Sect.  4 deals with the case when new types are drawn every 
period. Appendix A contains all the proofs.
2  The model
We consider a setup with overlapping generations of agents. Each generation 
consists of a single agent. Each agent lives for exactly nT periods where n and T are 
two positive integers. Let ℤ be the set of integers equal or greater than −n + 1 . The 
agent of generation z ∈ ℤ , or agent z for short, is born at the beginning of period zT 
and dies at the end of period (z + n)T − 1 . Hence, there are exactly n agents alive in 
any period.
Let A and Θ be, respectively, a set of feasible alternatives and a finite set of 
possible agent’s types. Both sets remain the same over time. We assume that 
types are drawn independently and identically across generations according to 
a probability distribution p such that p(𝜃) > 0 for each 휃 ∈ Θ . When types are 
assumed to be persistent, every agent’s type is drawn only once and remains the 
same throughout his life. When types are assumed to be non-persistent, each period 
a new type for every agent who is alive, is drawn independently and identically also 
across time according to p. The payoff of agent z in period t = zT ,… , (z + n)T − 1 
is u(at, 휃tz) if the agent’s type is 휃tz ∈ Θ and alternative at ∈ A is implemented in that 
period,4 and his lifetime payoff is simply
We make the following assumptions about u. First, we assume that the agents have 
strict preferences over the alternatives for every realization of types:
Assumption A1 u(a, 휃) ≠ u(b, 휃) for all a, b ∈ A such that a ≠ b, and for all 휃 ∈ Θ.
Second, we assume that the change in the state leads to the change in the ordinal 
preferences:
(z+n)T−1∑
t=zT
u(at, 휃
t
z
).
4 At the cost of additional notation, we could also allow u to depend on the agent’s identity, that is, to 
depend on z.
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Assumption A2 For every 휃,휙 ∈ Θ such that 휃 ≠ 휙 there exists a pair a, b ∈ A such 
that u(a, 𝜃) > u(b, 𝜃) and u(a,𝜙) < u(b,𝜙).
Later it will be convenient to write the pair (a, b) as (a(휃,휙), b(휃,휙)) with the 
convention that a(휃,휙) is more desirable in state 휃 and b(휃,휙) is more desirable 
in state 휙 . Finally, we assume that the payoffs are bounded: inf(a,휃)∈A×Θ u(a, 휃) and 
sup(a,휃)∈A×Θ u(a, 휃) are finite.
We consider the implementation of socially desirable alternatives from 
period 0 onwards. In period t, a social choice function f assigns an alternative 
in A as a function of types of all agents who are alive in that period, that is, 
f (휃t
z−n+1
,… , 휃t
z
) ∈ A where z = ⌊t∕T⌋ is the integer part when dividing t by T. 
Note that the first argument of f denotes the type of the oldest agent who is alive 
in that period; the second argument denotes the type of the second oldest agent 
who is alive and so on. Also note that f is assumed to be time independent. That 
is, f (휃t
z−n+1
,… , 휃t
z
) = f (휃휏
k−n+1
,… , 휃휏
k
) if (휃t
z−n+1
,… , 휃t
z
) = (휃휏
k−n+1
,… , 휃휏
k
) for any 
z and k and any t and 휏 . Therefore, to describe f, it is enough to specify how f 
depends on the types of agents 1,… , n.
A mechanism consists of messages that the agents can announce and an outcome 
function that selects a feasible alternative as a function of these messages. Let the 
message space of every agent in every period be M. It is without loss of generality, 
since we can always choose M to be sufficiently large. Hence, we can associate 
every mechanism with its outcome function. We restrict attention to deterministic 
mechanisms in which the agents announce their messages simultaneously. Let G be 
the set of all feasible mechanisms or, equivalently, outcome functions with a typical 
element g. Thus, given g ∈ G and m ∈ Mn , alternative a = g(m) ∈ A is implemented.
To avoid overcomplicating the notation, we next define histories and other 
relevant concepts for the case when types are persistent, which is the first case we 
analyse. When we will study the case with non-persistent types, we will clarify the 
necessary changes in the notation.
Since we now assume that agent’s type remains the same during his lifetime, we 
write 휃z instead of 휃tz . A history of types at the start of period t ≥ 0 is 
휁t = (휃−n+1,… , 휃0,… , 휃⌊t∕T⌋) , while a history of messages at the start of period 
t > 0 is 휇t = (m0,… ,mt−1) where mt = (mt⌊t∕T⌋−n+1,… ,mt⌊t∕T⌋) is a profile of period 
t messages with mt
z
 being the message of agent z. A history is ht = (휁t,휇t) for t > 0 
and h0 = 휁0 . Let Ht denote the space of all period t histories. We assume that the 
agents who are alive in period t, can distinguish between any two period t histories. 
That is, we are in a complete and perfect information environment. On the other 
hand, the social designer cannot distinguish between any two period t histories 
ht = (휁t,휇t) and h�t = (휁 �t ,휇�t ) if 휇t = 휇�t , and 휁t and 휁 ′t  share the same first n − 1 
elements 휃−n+1,… , 휃−1 . That is, we assume that the types of those agents who were 
born before period 0 are also known to the designer.
A regime, r, describes which mechanism is selected after each possible history: 
gt = r(ht) ∈ G subject to the restriction that r(ht) = r(h�t) if the designer cannot 
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distinguish between histories ht and h′t . Note that we restrict attention to deterministic 
regimes. Because of that and also because the mechanisms are deterministic, it is 
fine to omit from the description of history ht which mechanisms and alternatives 
have been selected in periods 0,… , t − 1 . We assume that the designer commits to 
a regime at the start of period 0 and that the agents know which regime the designer 
employs.
A pure strategy of agent z, sz , maps histories into messages: sz(ht) ∈ M 
for all t = zT ,… , (z + n)T − 1 and ht ∈ Ht.5 Let Sz be the space of agent z’s 
strategies. Let s be a profile of strategies, one strategy for each z ∈ ℤ . Also, let 
s(ht) = (s⌊t∕T⌋−n+1(ht),… , s⌊t∕T⌋(ht)) . Given ht and s, let q(ht|ht, s) = 1 and for any 
𝜏 > t , let
For any z ∈ ℤ , any t = zT ,… , (z + n)T − 1 , and any ht , the (expected) payoff of 
agent z for the rest of his life is
where 휃z is the z + n-th element of 휁t (since the first element of 휁t is 휃−n+1 ) and 
g휏 = r(h휏).
A strategy profile s is a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of r if for all 
z ∈ ℤ , all t = zT ,… , (z + n)T − 1 , all ht ∈ Ht , and all s�z ∈ Sz , it is true that 
vz(s|ht, r) ≥ vz((s�z, s−z)|ht, r) . A regime r repeatedly implements f in SPE if the set of 
SPE is non-empty and for each SPE s, we have that gt(s(ht)) = f (휃⌊t∕T⌋−n+1,… , 휃⌊t∕T⌋) 
for all t and ht such that q(ht|h0, s) > 0 , where (휃⌊t∕T⌋−n+1,… , 휃⌊t∕T⌋) are the last n 
elements of 휁t . f is repeatedly implementable in SPE if there exists r that repeatedly 
implements it in SPE.
3  Persistent types
We start with an example that illustrates the results for the case when agents’ types 
do not change during their lifetime.
Example 1 Let n = 3 , T ≥ 3 , A = {a, b, c, d} , Θ = {휃, 휃�} with p(휃) = 1
2
 . The per-
period payoffs are given in the following table: 
q(h휏 �ht, s) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
q(h휏−1�ht, s) if 휏∕T ∉ ℤ, 휁휏 = 휁휏−1, 휇휏 = �휇휏−1, s�h휏−1��,
q(h휏−1�ht, s)p(휃) if 휏∕T ∈ ℤ, 휁휏 = �휁휏−1, 휃�, 휇휏 = �휇휏−1, s�h휏−1��,
0 otherwise.
vz(s|ht, r) =
(z+n)T−1∑
휏=t
∑
h휏∈H휏
q(h휏 |ht, s)u(g휏(s(h휏)), 휃z),
5 From now on, zT should be understood as max{zT , 0}.
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u(⋅, 휃) u
(
⋅, 휃′
)
a 0 0
b 1 2
c 2 1
d 3 3
 The results of this section will tell that
• Any f that never selects the best alternative d, is repeatedly implementable.
• If f selects d for some but not all type profiles, then it might not be 
implementable. For example, let f (휃1, 휃2, 휃3) = d when (휃1, 휃2, 휃3) = (휃, 휃�, 휃) or 
(휃1, 휃2, 휃3) = (휃
�, 휃, 휃�) , and f (휃1, 휃2, 휃3) = a otherwise.6 If agents, irrespective of 
their true types, behave as if the types of consecutive agents alternate between 휃 
and 휃′ , they can secure d in every period. Nobody has incentives to deviate and f 
is not implementable.
• Even if f selects d only for some type profiles, it might still be implementable. For 
example, let f (휃1, 휃2, 휃3) = d when (휃1, 휃2, 휃3) = (휃, 휃�, 휃) and f (휃1, 휃2, 휃3) = a 
otherwise. This f is implementable because agents cannot secure d in every 
period.
The example suggests that implementation of SCF will only fail if every agent can 
obtain his maximal lifetime payoff when misrepresenting their types. We now proceed 
to show it formally. Let f (Θ) = {a ∈ A|∃(휃1,… , 휃n) ∈ Θn s.t. f (휃1,… , 휃n) = a} 
denote the range of f. Let a(휃) = argmaxa∈A u(a, 휃) and a(휃) = argmina∈A u(a, 휃) , 
which are assumed to exist.7 Let ℤ+ be the set of non-negative integers.
Condition C1 (OLG-unanimity) If there exist a ∈ A and an infinite sequence of types 
휃0, 휃1,… such that
1. a(휃) = a for all 휃 ∈ Θ , and
2. f (휃z,… , 휃z+n−1) = a for all z ∈ ℤ+,
then f (휃�
1
,… , 휃�
n
) = a for all (휃�
1
,… , 휃�
n
) ∈ Θn , that is, f is constant.
Condition C1 is a mild unanimity condition, which we call OLG-unanimity. The 
first premise of the condition says that all types agree on the best alternative, while 
the second premise ensures that a can be selected by f in every period. In particular, 
there exists an infinite sequence of types such that if one evaluates f for any n adjacent 
types in this sequence, the selected alternative will be a. Further, the statement of 
6 Recall that because f is time independent, it is enough to specify how f depends on the types of agents 
1,… , n.
7 If the maximum did not exist for some 휃 , then there must be a ∈ A�f (Θ) such that u(a, 𝜃) > u(b, 𝜃) for 
all b ∈ f (Θ) . Then, let a(휃) = a . This will not affect the necessary condition as its premises only apply 
when a(휃) ∈ f (Θ) . a(휃) can be defined similarly.
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the second premise can be strengthened by noting that this infinite sequence of types 
consists of repetitions of the same finite sequence. This follows from the fact that Θ 
is finite and f only depends on the types of n consecutive generations. Hence, there 
must exist k and z in ℤ+ such that (휃k,… , 휃k+n−1) = (휃z,… , 휃z+n−1) . But then we can 
construct another sequence that consists of repetitions of 휃k,… , 휃z−1.
We claim that if the above two premises hold, then there exists an equilibrium in 
which a is selected in every period irrespective of the realized types. Hence, if f is 
repeatedly implementable, then it must be a constant function that selects a for all 
possible realizations of types. The intuition is simple: a is the best alternative for all 
types and they can ensure that it is selected in every period by pretending to have 
types as defined by the sequence 휃0, 휃1,… . Clearly, no agent will have incentives to 
deviate. Therefore, there exists an equilibrium in which a is implemented in every 
period. Thus, f must be constant. Formally,8
Proposition 1 If f is repeatedly implementable in SPE, then it must satisfy 
OLG-unanimity.
OLG-unanimity is satisfied by most (interesting) SCFs. For example, an SCF that 
selects an efficient alternative in every period (even in static sense), trivially satisfies 
it. Next we establish that OLG-unanimity is not only necessary but also sufficient if 
there are at least three agents alive at any moment and they live long enough.
Theorem 1 Suppose n ≥ 3 and T ≥ 3 . If f satisfies OLG-unanimity, then it is repeat-
edly implementable in SPE.
To prove the theorem, we construct a regime and show that it implements 
f in SPE whenever n ≥ 3 , T ≥ 3 , and f satisfies OLG-unanimity. Although the 
description of the regime is rather involved, it shares similarities with the canonical 
mechanism that is used for one-shot implementation in SPE.9 In a nutshell, in period 
zT, agents are asked to report the types of the three youngest agents. That is, on the 
one hand, period zT messages are used to elicit the type of the newborn agent z, but 
on the other hand, they also allow the agents to confess if they have misreported 
the types of agents z − 2 and z − 1 in periods (z − 2)T  and (z − 1)T  . Further, agent 
z − 1 serves the role of “whistle-blower” in period zT. If he blows the whistle, then 
periods zT + 1 and zT + 2 are used to determine whether agent z − 1 or other agents 
are lying. Therefore, we need that n ≥ 3 and T ≥ 3.10
9 See, for example, Appendix B in Abreu and Sen (1990) for the description of the latter.
10 Theorem 1 can be extended to T = 1, 2 if n is increased appropriately. This, however, requires changes 
in the regime because it is written assuming that T ≥ 3.
8 All proofs appear in Appendix A.
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3.1  Discussion
Comparison with one-shot subgame perfect implementation. Moore and 
Repullo (1988), Abreu and Sen (1990) and Vartiainen (2007) have studied what 
can be implemented in SPE using dynamic mechanisms, but unlike repeated 
implementation, an alternative is selected only once at the very end. Despite this 
difference, the above results can be related to one-shot implementation in SPE. 
Therefore, we now briefly sketch the problem of one-shot implementation in SPE, 
which we adapt to make it comparable to our model.
Thus, let the set of agents be N = {1,… , n} , let the set of states be Θn with a 
typical element 𝜃 = (𝜃1,… , 𝜃n) , let the set of alternatives be A = An with a 
typical element a⃗ = (a1,… , an) , and let the payoff function of agent z ∈ N be 
u(a⃗, 𝜃z) =
∑z
t=1
u(at, 𝜃z) . The objective of the designer is to implement alternative 
f (𝜃) ∈ A when the state is 𝜃 . To do that, the designer employs a multi-stage 
mechanism.
Abreu and Sen (1990) show in their Theorem 1 that if f is one-shot implementable 
in SPE, then it satisfies the following condition with respect to some B ⊆ A.11
Condition C2 For all (𝜃,𝜙) ∈ Θn × Θn such that f (𝜃) ≠ f (𝜙) , there exist a sequence 
of agents z(1),… , z(K) ∈ N and a sequence of alternatives a⃗1,… , a⃗K+1 ∈ B with 
a⃗1 = f (𝜃) such that
1. u(a⃗k, 𝜃z(k)) ≥ u(a⃗k+1, 𝜃z(k)) for k = 1,… ,K,
2. u(a⃗K ,𝜙z(K)) < u(a⃗K+1,𝜙z(K)),
3. a⃗k ≠ argmaxa⃗∈B u(a⃗,𝜙z(k)) for k = 1,… ,K.
We can interpret our results in terms of Condition C2. First, one can set K = 3 
in Condition C212 and choose as z(3) an agent whose type differs in states 𝜃 and 𝜙 . 
Assumption A2 guarantees that this agent has a preference reversal between some a⃗3 
and a⃗4 that is required by C2.1 and C2.2. Second, we can choose as z(1) any agent for 
whom a⃗1 = f (𝜃) does not result in his highest possible payoff in state 𝜙 as it would 
violate C2.3. In the OLG setup, the existence of such an agent is guaranteed by Con-
dition C1. That is, if f is not a constant function, then Condition C1 is satisfied only 
if its premises are empty, which then implies that there always exists an agent who 
does not expect his maximal lifetime payoff. Finally, say, if z(1) = n − 1 , then we 
set z(2) = n . In the OLG setup, agent n − 1 will die before agent n. Therefore, it is 
always possible to find a⃗2 such that u(f (𝜃), 𝜃n−1) ≥ u(a⃗2, 𝜃n−1) but a⃗2 is not the worst 
outcome for agent n in state 𝜃 . Because of the latter, it is also always possible to 
find a⃗3 and a⃗4 that satisfy C2.1 and C.2.2. For example, if f (𝜃) = (a1,… , an−1, an) , 
11 Vartiainen (2007) identifies the necessary and sufficient condition for one-shot implementation in 
SPE. Here, we focus on the more intuitive part of that condition.
12 But one cannot set K = 1 , that is, Maskin monotonicity of f is not guaranteed. The implication is that 
strictly less SCFs are repeatedly implementable if we adopt Nash equilibrium as a solution concept.
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then we can set a⃗2 = (a1,… , an−1, a(𝜃n)) , a⃗3 = (a(𝜃z(3),𝜙z(3)), a1,… , an−1) , and 
a⃗4 = (b(𝜃z(3),𝜙z(3)), a1,… , an−1).13
Relaxing Assumption A1. If we allow for weak preferences, the OLG-unanimity 
condition remains necessary in its current form as long as the best alternative a(휃) is 
unique for all 휃 . The proof of Theorem 1 also remains true if a(휃) is unique for all 휃 
and, additionally, there exist two alternatives c, d ∈ A such that no type is indifferent 
between them.
Relaxing Assumption A2. If we allow T to be sufficiently large, we can replace 
Assumption A2 with the following one:
Assumption A3 For every 휃,휙 ∈ Θ, there do not exist 𝛼 > 0 and 훽 such that 
u(a, 휃) = 훼u(a,휙) + 훽 for all a ∈ A.
Assumption A3 says that for every pair 휃,휙 ∈ Θ , we can always find two lotter-
ies over the alternatives in A (where the probabilities are rational numbers) such that 
type 휃 prefers one lottery over the other, while it is opposite for type 휙 . But with 
each lottery we can associate a (finite) sequence of alternatives where the frequency 
of each alternative in the sequence is equal to the probability that this alternative is 
chosen in the corresponding lottery. Then, we can replace alternatives a(휃,휙) and 
b(휃,휙) that we use in the proof of Theorem 1, with the constructed sequences.
(Re)starting implementation. It is assumed that the designer knows the types of 
agents −n + 1,… ,−1 . The following example shows that it might not be possible to 
implement an SCF (from period 0) if the designer does not know their types.
Example 2 Let n = 3 , T ≥ 3 , A = {a, b, c} , Θ = {휃, 휃�, 휃��} with p(휃) = p(휃�) = 1
3
 . 
The per-period payoffs are given in the following table: 
u(⋅, 휃) u
(
⋅, 휃′
)
u
(
⋅, 휃′′
)
a 0 1 2
b 1 0 1
c 2 2 0
 Let f (휃1, 휃2, 휃3) = c if 휃1 = 휃 and f (휃1, 휃2, 휃3) = a otherwise. f satisfies OLG-una-
nimity because there is no alternative that is best for all types. Therefore, f is imple-
mentable if the designer knows the types of agents −2 and −1.
Suppose now that the designer does not know their types. Also, suppose the 
types of agents −2 , −1 , and 0 are 휃′ , 휃 , and 휃 , respectively. If f is implemented, then 
alternative a is selected during periods 0,… , T − 1 and alternative c during periods 
T ,… , 3T − 1 . However, if agents −2 , −1 , and 0 behave as if they all were of type 휃 , 
then they can obtain alternative c during periods 0,… , 3T − 1 . None of these agents 
can be incentivized to deviate from this deception since they are getting their best 
alternative for the rest of their lives. Agent 1 might have incentives to challenge the 
13 a(휃,휙) and b(휃,휙) are defined after Assumption A2.
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lie, but by the time he is born, agent −2 has already passed away. Thus, we conclude 
that f cannot be implemented from period 0 if the designer does not know the types 
of agents −2 and −1.
However, the implementation is still possible starting with period (n − 1)T  , that 
is, once agents −n + 1,… ,−1 have passed away. To see it, fix arbitrary types for 
these agents. We also slightly modify the regime in the proof of Theorem  1. As 
mentioned before, the regime allows agents in period zT to confess that they have 
lied about the types of agents z − 2 and z − 1 previously. The regime also allows 
agent z − 1 to challenge the types of agents z − 2, z − 1, z that are reported by other 
agents in period zT. Because the types of agents −2 and −1 are arbitrarily fixed, we 
need to preclude that the agents confess or challenge their types. With this modifica-
tion, it is still true that in any equilibrium, the types of agents 0, 1,… are reported 
truthfully and, hence, f is implemented from period (n − 1)T  onwards.
The regime also has the property that once a deviation from the equilibrium play 
has occurred, a predetermined, infinite sequence of alternatives is implemented. 
This can be costly from the perspective of the designer. However, similar to how it 
is done in the previous paragraph, we can restart the implementation once the agents 
who are alive at the time of deviation, have passed away. Thus, the regime can be 
made robust to mistakes of agents.
Less than perfect information. We can relax the assumption that the agents who 
are alive in period t, can distinguish between any period t histories. It is enough if 
the type of agent z is common knowledge only among the agents who are alive in 
periods zT , (z + 1)T , (z + 2)T  as these are the periods when his type is elicited by 
the regime in the proof of Theorem 1. Further, it is enough if only period zT and 
zT + 1 messages are observable for all z ∈ ℤ+ and only by the agents who are alive 
in period zT. With such less than perfect information, Theorem  1 remains true if 
instead of SPE, we use extended subgame perfect equilibrium as the solution con-
cept (for the definition, see page 877 in Kreps and Wilson 1982).14
4  Non‑persistent types
Now we consider the other extreme when for every agent, a new type is drawn 
every period during his lifetime. Specifically, we assume that the types are drawn 
independently and identically both across periods and agents according to p. Also, 
we maintain Assumption A1, while Assumption A2 is not needed for the results of 
this section.
 Lee and Sabourian (2011) consider a setup with infinitely-lived agents and 
payoff discounting and show in their Theorem  1 that when new types are drawn 
every period, any SCF that is not weakly efficient in the range cannot be repeatedly 
14 It should also be noted that we do not use p anywhere in the proof of Theorem  1. It is enough to 
assume that it is common knowledge among agents that every 휃 ∈ Θ is realized with a strictly positive 
probability (which we use in the proof of Claim 1).
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implemented if the agents are sufficiently patient. We establish a similar negative 
result in the OLG setup when agents are sufficiently long-lived.
To show this result, we modify some of the notation and introduce some new one. 
Since now past realizations of types do not tell anything about the current period’s 
types, it is convenient to denote the oldest agent in the current period as agent 1, the 
second oldest agent as agent 2, and so on up to the youngest agent who is denoted as 
agent n. Let N = {1,… , n} . If f is implemented, then the ex ante (that is, before the 
agent knows his type) per-period payoff of agent i ∈ N is15 
Note that every agent’s ex ante lifetime payoff is T ⋅∑n
i=1
ui(f ).
Let 훿 ∶ Θn → Θn be a deterministic deception where 훿(휃1,… , 휃n) = (휃�1,… , 휃�n) 
says that the agents act as if their types were (휃�
1
,… , 휃�
n
) , although their true types 
are (휃1,… , 휃n) . Let the space of all deterministic deceptions be D. Also, let f◦훿 
stand for the composite function of f and 훿 : f◦훿(휃1,… , 휃n) = f (훿(휃1,… , 휃n)) for all 
(휃1,… , 휃n) ∈ Θ
n . Finally, let 𝛿 be a random deception that selects a deterministic 
deception 훿 with probability 𝛿(𝛿) and let Δ be the space of all random deceptions. 
The payoff of agent i ∈ N from a deception 𝛿 is ∑𝛿∈D 𝛿(𝛿)ui(f◦𝛿) , which we denote 
as ui(f◦𝛿).
Definition 1 A social choice function f is weakly efficient in the range if there does 
not exist 𝛿 ∈ Δ such that ui(f◦𝛿) > ui(f ) for all i ∈ N.
This is essentially the definition that Lee and Sabourian (2011) use, except that 
they convexify the set of payoffs without public randomization. We are, however, 
going to use a different definition of efficiency. In the setup of Lee and Sabourian 
(2011), there is no difference between the ex ante per-period payoffs and the average 
expected lifetime payoffs. This is not the case in the OLG setup. For example, the 
current second-oldest agent will become the oldest agent once the current oldest 
agent dies. The right notion of efficiency should take into account the lifetime 
payoffs. Therefore, we will use the following stronger notion of efficiency (see more 
discussion after Theorem 2):
Definition 2 A social choice function f is weakly generation-efficient in the range if 
there does not exist 𝛿 ∈ Δ such that ∑i
j=1
uj(f◦𝛿) >
∑i
j=1
uj(f ) for all i ∈ N.
To simplify the analysis, we also make the following assumption about SCFs:
Assumption A4 There exist types 휃1 , (휃2,… , 휃n) , and (휃�2,… , 휃�n) such that 
f (휃1, 휃2,… , 휃n) ≠ f (휃1, 휃
�
2
,… , 휃�
n
).
ui(f ) =
∑
(휃1,…,휃n)∈Θ
n
n∏
j=1
p(휃j)u(f (휃1,… , 휃n), 휃i).
15 Thus, the subscript in ui(f ) indicates the agent’s age cohort.
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This assumption rules out SCFs that only vary with the type of the 
oldest agent. Unlike the setup of Lee and Sabourian (2011), agents live for 
a finite number of periods in our setup and the oldest agent might not have 
incentives to go along with a deception in his final periods. However, when 
f satisfies Assumption A4, such incentives can be provided. For example, if 
u(f (𝜃1, 𝜃
�
2
,… , 𝜃�
n
), 𝜃1) > u(f (𝜃1, 𝜃2,… , 𝜃n), 𝜃1) , then in state (휃1, 휃2,… , 휃n) , the 
agents can behave as if the state was (휃1, 휃�2,… , 휃�n).
Theorem  2 Suppose f satisfies Assumption A4 and n ≥ 2 . If f is not weakly gen-
eration-efficient in the range, then there exists T∗ such that for all T ≥ T∗ , f is not 
repeatedly implementable in SPE.
Example 1 continued Let f (휃1, 휃2, 휃3) = b when (휃1, 휃2, 휃3) = (휃�, 휃�, 휃�) 
and f (휃1, 휃2, 휃3) = c otherwise. This f satisfies Assumption A4 because 
f (휃�, 휃�, 휃�) = b ≠ f (휃�, 휃, 휃) = c . Also, f is not weakly (generation) effi-
cient. To see it, let 훿(휃�, 휃�, 휃) = 훿(휃�, 휃, 휃�) = 훿(휃, 휃�, 휃�) = (휃�, 휃�, 휃�) and 
훿(휃1, 휃2, 휃3) = (휃1, 휃2, 휃3) for all other configurations of types. With this decep-
tion, the alternative that is preferred by the majority of agents is selected. Then, 
ui(f◦𝛿) =
14
8
> ui(f ) =
13
8
 for all i = 1, 2, 3 . The theorem says that f is not repeatedly 
implementable if T is large enough. On the other hand, f satisfies Maskin monoto-
nicity16 and, hence, is one-shot implementable in Nash equilibrium.
To prove the theorem, we borrow ideas from the literature on folk theorems 
for OLG games and, in particular, from Smith (1992). If f is not weakly 
generation-efficient in the range, then there exists a deception 훿 ∈ Δ such that ∑i
j=1
uj(f◦𝛿) >
∑i
j=1
uj(f ) for all i ∈ N . Because of Assumption A4, there also 
exists a deception 훾 such that u(f (훾(휃1, 휃2,… , 휃n)), 휃1) ≥ u(f (휃1, 휃2,… , 휃n), 휃1) for 
all (휃1, 휃2,… , 휃n) with a strict inequality for at least one (휃1, 휃2,… , 휃n) . Call the T 
periods between the births of two consecutive agents as an overlap. We construct 
a strategy profile such that on the equilibrium path, agents deceive according to 훿 
for the first Q periods of each overlap and next they deceive according to 훾 for the 
remaining T − Q periods of every overlap. If a deviation from the path ever occurs, 
then the agents simply stop deceiving from that point on.
We prove that no agent has incentives to deviate from the equilibrium path for 
sufficiently large T, in three steps. First, the oldest agent does not have incentives to 
deviate during the last T − Q periods of his life while he is being rewarded through 
the deception 훾 . Second, any gain that this agent can obtain from deviating in 
period Q, can be outweighed by the reward in the last T − Q periods when T − Q is 
sufficiently large. Thus, agent 1 does not want to deviate in period Q. The same is 
also true for the first Q − 1 periods of the overlap because agents stop deceiving after 
any deviation and u1(f◦𝛿) > u1(f ) . Third, we show that no agent i = 2,… , n also 
16 Maskin monotonicity basically requires that f satisfies Condition C2 for K = 1.
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wants to deviate in any period of the overlap when Q is sufficiently large because ∑i
j=1
uj(f◦𝛿) >
∑i
j=1
uj(f ) holds.
4.1  Discussion
Implementation in Nash equilibrium. Theorem 2 clearly remains valid if we replace 
SPE with Nash equilibrium as the solution concept. Note that Lee and Sabourian 
(2011) only prove their result for Nash equilibrium.
Weak efficiency in the range. If there exists 훿 ∈ Δ such that ui(f◦𝛿) > ui(f ) for 
all i ∈ N , then it is also true that ∑i
j=1
uj(f◦𝛿) >
∑i
j=1
uj(f ) for all i ∈ N . That is, 
whenever f is not weakly efficient in the range, then it is also not weakly generation-
efficient in the range. Therefore, if SCFs, which are not weakly generation-efficient 
in the range, cannot be repeatedly implemented, then it is also true about SCFs, 
which are not weakly efficient in the range. That is, the result that we prove is 
stronger than the one if we only assumed that f is not weakly efficient in the range.
Relaxing Assumption A4. Although Assumption A4 can be relaxed, we claim that 
we cannot dispense of it completely. Thus, suppose that f only varies with the type 
of agent 1. Therefore, we now write f (휃1) instead of f (휃1,… , 휃n) . Also, suppose 
that f satisfies the following condition:
Condition C3 If f (휃1) ≠ f (휃�1) for some 휃1, 휃�1 ∈ Θ , then there exists a ∈ A such that 
u(f (𝜃1), 𝜃1) > u(a, 𝜃1) and u(f (𝜃1), 𝜃�1) < u(a, 𝜃�1).
It is simply the definition of Maskin monotonicity, given that only agent 1 can 
serve as a whistle-blower.
We now argue that whenever f satisfies Condition C3, one can design a regime 
such that no deception that results in an undesirable outcome, can be supported in 
equilibrium even if f is not weakly generation-efficient in the range and T is large.17 
Thus, suppose that the agents deceive according to some 훿 (where now 훿 ∶ Θn → Θ ) 
in period (z + n)T − 1 , which is the last period for agent z. But because f satisfies 
Condition C3, we can incentivize agent z to deviate. Thus, the agents cannot deceive 
in that period. Suppose now that the agents deceive according to some 훿 in period 
(z + n)T − 2 . The payoff of agent z from the deception is u(f (𝛿(𝜃)), 𝜃1) + u1(f ) 
where 𝜃 = (𝜃1,… , 𝜃n) . If he deviates from the deception, his payoff is u(a, 휃1) + v 
where v is his expected payoff in period (z + n)T − 1 . We can always pick 
v = u1(f ) and, by Condition C3, find a such that u(a, 𝛿(𝜃)) < u(f (𝛿(𝜃)), 𝛿(𝜃)) and 
u(a, 𝜃1) > u(f (𝛿(𝜃)), 𝜃1) so that the deviation is profitable. Thus, the agents cannot 
deceive in period (z + n)T − 2 either. Working backwards, the same argument also 
applies to the periods (z + n − 1)T ,… , (z + n)T − 3 . Also, since z was arbitrary, it 
follows that the agents will never deceive.
17 Note, however, we do not claim that f is necessarily repeatedly implementable since there can be equi-
libria in which the agents do not follow a common deception in some period.
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Example 3 Let n ≥ 2 , T ≥ 1 , A = {a, b, c, d} , Θ = {휃, 휃�} with p(휃) = 1
2
 . The per-
period payoffs are given in the following table: 
u(⋅, 휃) u
(
⋅, 휃′
)
a 4 6
b 6 4
c 0 8
d 8 0
f only depends on the type of agent 1 as follows: f (휃) = a and f (휃�) = b . Then, 
u1(f ) = 4 and ui(f ) = 5 for i = 2,… , n . Let 𝛿(𝜃) = 𝜃� if 휃1 = 휃 and 𝛿(𝜃) = 𝜃 if 
휃1 = 휃
� . Then, u1(f◦훿) = 6 and ui(f◦훿) = 5 for i = 2,… , n . Hence, f is not weakly 
generation-efficient in the range. Condition C3 is satisfied: 1) u(f (𝜃), 𝜃) > u(c, 𝜃) 
and u(f (𝜃), 𝜃�) < u(c, 𝜃�) ; 2) u(f (𝜃�), 𝜃�) > u(d, 𝜃�) and u(f (𝜃�), 𝜃) < u(d, 𝜃) . The 
discussion in the previous paragraph says that no deception (not just 훿 ) can be 
maintained in the equilibrium.18
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A proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 Suppose f is repeatedly implementable in SPE. Let s denote 
an SPE. Suppose that the premises of Condition C1 hold. Using s, we will construct 
another equilibrium strategy profile s′ that implements alternative a forever after 
some history where a is defined in Condition C1.
Let 휃−n+1,… , 휃−1 be given. Let 휃0, 휃1,… be the sequence defined in Condition 
C1. Let 휁t = (휃−n+1,… , 휃⌊t∕T⌋) be period t history of types that is obtained from 
these two sequences. Let 휇t = (휇t−1, s(ht−1)) be period t history of messages and 
ht = (휁t,휇t) be period t history (which are obtained recursively) that would arise if 
the agents followed strategies s and the history of types was 휁t . We reserve notation 
휁t,휇t, ht to these particular histories. Also note that these histories occur with a 
strictly positive probability if the agents follow strategies s.
18 Even more, one can argue that this f is repeatedly implementable using a regime, which is similar to 
the one in Mezzetti and Renou (2017) or Azacis and Vida (2019) if n ≥ 3.
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For any period t ≥ nT  , let Θt denote the set of period t histories of types that 
has 휁nT as a sub-history and let H�t = {h�t = (휁 �t ,휇t)|휁 �t ∈ Θt} . Thus, H′t consists 
of histories that only differ from ht in their history of types after period nT. Let 
H�
t
= {ht} for all t = 0,… , nT − 1 . Let s′ be defined as follows: s�(h�t) = s(ht) for all 
h�
t
∈ H�
t
 and s�(h��
t
) = s(h��
t
) for all h��
t
∈ Ht�H
�
t
 . Thus, after any h�
t
∈ H�
t
 , s′ tells the 
agents to send the same messages as after history ht.
If the agents follow strategies in s′ , alternative a is implemented forever after 
history hnT irrespective of the realised types. We verify that s′ is an SPE. Since s is 
an SPE, then by definition, s′ implies Nash equilibrium play in subgames starting 
after any h��
t
∈ Ht�H
�
t
 . Consider a subgame after any h�
t
∈ H�
t
 for t ≥ nT  . Since the 
agents receive their best alternative in every period, they do not have incentives 
to deviate. Finally, consider a subgame after ht for t = 0,… , nT − 1 . The payoff of 
any agent who is alive in period t and deviates from s′ , is the same as his payoff if 
he deviated from s. On the other hand, his payoff if he does not deviate from s′ is 
higher than his payoff if he follows s because he obtains his best alternative in future 
periods with higher probability. Since he did not have incentives to deviate from s, 
he does not have incentives to deviate from s′ . Thus, s′ is an SPE. But then, if f is 
repeatedly implementable in SPE, it must be a constant function that always selects 
a.   ◻
Proof of Theorem 1 Any constant f is trivially implementable. Therefore, we assume 
that f is not constant. But then Condition C1 will only be satisfied if its premises are 
empty.
Let b(휃) = argmaxa∈f (Θ)�{a(휃)} u(a, 휃) denote the best alternative for type 휃 in the 
range of f, which is different from a(휃).
As part of the regime, we are going repeatedly to use the following game:
The integer game. Let M = Θ3 × ℤ+ . Suppose we are in period t. Given period 
t messages mt ∈ Mn , let k be the agent who has announced the highest integer and 
suppose mt
k
= (휓 , ⋅, ⋅, ⋅) . (Ties are always broken in favour of the agent with the 
highest index.) Let z be the youngest agent in period t. Then, 
1. If k = z , then g(mt) = b(휓) and g(m휏) = a(휓) for all 𝜏 > t and all m휏.
2. If k ≠ z , then g(mt) = g(m휏) = a(휓) for all 휏 = t + 1,… , (k + n)T − 1 and 
g(m휏) = b(휓) for all 𝜏 > (k + n)T − 1 and all m휏.
It is easy to see that the integer game does not have an equilibrium, even if all agents 
have identical preferences: the youngest agent prefers if part 1 applies, while the 
second youngest agent prefers if part 2 applies.19 (Note that the assumptions that 
a(휓) is unique, n ≥ 3 , and T ≥ 2 play the role.)
The regime r is defined as follows. Let M = Θ3 × ℤ+ . We fix two distinct, 
arbitrary alternatives c, d ∈ A . For any period t, let Nt = {⌊t∕T⌋ − n + 1,… , ⌊t∕T⌋} 
19 In the regime below, the same result still holds even though the message space when the integer game 
will apply, will be a subset of Mn.
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denote the set of agents who are alive in that period. Let 휃−n+1,… , 휃−1 be given. We 
apply the following algorithm starting with period t = 0 : 
0. Let z = t∕T .
1. If there is (휂z−2, 휂z−1, 휂z) ∈ Θ3 s.t. mtk = (휂z−2, 휂z−1, 휂z, ⋅) for at least n − 1 agents 
k ∈ Nt , then let g(mt) = f (휃z−n+1,… , 휃z−1, 휂z) . 
(a) I f  mt
z−1
= (휂z−2, 휂z−1, 휂z, ⋅) and (휂z−2, 휂z−1) = (휃z−2, 휃z−1) ,  then let 
g(m휏) = f (휃z−n+1,… , 휃z−1, 휂z) for all 휏 = t + 1,… , t + T − 1 and all m휏 . 
(Thus, the messages in periods 휏 = t + 1,… , t + T − 1 play no role.) Set 
휃z = 휂z and t = (z + 1)T  , and go back to part 0.
(b) If mt
z−1
= (휂z−2, 휂z−1, 휂z, ⋅) but (휂z−2, 휂z−1) ≠ (휃z−2, 휃z−1) , then g(m휏) = c for 
휏 = t + 1 , g(m휏) = d for 휏 = t + 2,… , t + T − 1 , and g(m휏) = c for 휏 ≥ t + T  
and all m휏.
(c) If mt
z−1
= (휙z−2,휙z−1,휙z, ⋅) ≠ (휂z−2, 휂z−1, 휂z, ⋅) , then let i ∈ {z − 2, z − 1, z} 
s.t. 휙i ≠ 휂i . Set t = zT + 1 and go to part 3.
2. For the messages that do not fall under part 1, the outcome is determined by the 
integer game.
3. In period t = zT + 1 , 
(a) I f  mt
k
= (⋅, ⋅, ⋅, 0) fo r  a t  l ea s t  n − 1 agen t s  k ∈ Nt  ,  t hen 
g(mt) = g(m휏) = a(휙z−1) for  al l  휏 = t + 1,… , (z + n − 1)T − 1 and 
g(m휏) = b(휙z−1) for 휏 ≥ (z + n − 1)T  and all m휏.
(b) If mt
k
= (⋅, ⋅, ⋅, 1) for at least n − 1 agents k ∈ Nt , including agent z, 
then g(mt) = g(m휏) = a(휂z−1) for all 휏 = t + 1,… , (z + n − 1)T − 1 , 
g(m휏) = a(휂z−1) for 휏 = (z + n − 1)T , (z + n − 1)T + 1 , and g(m휏) = a(휓z) 
for all 휏 ≥ (z + n − 1)T + 2 and all m휏 where 휓z is given by mtz = (휓z, ⋅, ⋅, 1).
(c) If mt
k
= (⋅, ⋅, ⋅, 1) for all k ∈ Nt�{z} while mtz = (휓z, ⋅, ⋅, l) where l ≠ 1 , then 
g(mt) = a(휂z−1) . Set t = zT + 2 and go to part 4.
(d) For all other messages, the outcome is determined by the integer game.
4. In period t = zT + 2 , 
(a) If mt
k
= (⋅, ⋅, ⋅, 0) for at least n − 1 agents k ∈ Nt , then g(mt) = a(휂z−1) and 
g(m휏) = a(휓z) for all 𝜏 > t and all m휏.
(b) If mt
k
= (⋅, ⋅, ⋅, 1) for at least n − 1 agents k ∈ Nt , including agent i, then 
g(mt) = a(휂i,휙i) , g(mt+1) = g(mt+2) = a(휂z−1) , and g(m휏) = a(휂z−1) for all 
𝜏 > t + 2 and all m휏.
(c) If mt
k
= (⋅, ⋅, ⋅, 1) for all k ∈ Nt�{i} while mti = (⋅, ⋅, ⋅, l) where l ≠ 1 , then 
g(mt) = b(휂i,휙i) , g(mt+1) = g(mt+2) = a(휂z−1) , and g(m휏) = a(휂z−1) for all 
𝜏 > t + 2 and all m휏.
(d) For all other messages, the outcome is determined by the integer game.
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If period zT messages fall under part 1a, we will say that they are unanimous. Note 
that if the messages are unanimous in period zT, then they must also have been 
unanimous in periods kT for all 0 ≤ k < z . We will say that the unanimous messages 
are truthful if the agents report their true types.
We first construct equilibrium strategies that implement f in SPE. Let 휃z denote 
the true type of agent z for all z ∈ ℤ . In period t = 0 , let m0
k
= (휃−2, 휃−1, 휃0, ⋅) for 
all k ∈ N0 . For any t > 0 , let mtk = (휃⌊t∕T⌋−2, 휃⌊t∕T⌋−1, 휃⌊t∕T⌋, ⋅) for all k ∈ Nt if agents 
sent unanimous messages in period ⌊(t − 1)∕T⌋T  ; otherwise, mt
k
= (휃k, ⋅, ⋅, 1) for all 
k ∈ Nt . In words, the strategies require every period to announce the true types of 
the three youngest agents who are alive in that period as long as the last time when 
a new agent was born, the agents sent unanimous (either truthful or untruthful) 
messages; otherwise, keep announcing one’s own true type and integer 1 forever. If 
they follow these strategies, f is clearly implemented in every period. Agent z − 1 can 
unilaterally change the outcome only if he deviates in period zT. Given the defined 
strategies, the deviation will trigger part 3b. Since the other agents have announced 
the true type of agent z − 1 , this agent will receive his worst alternative a(휃z−1) in 
every period for the rest of his life starting with period zT + 1 and the deviation will 
not affect what he receives in period zT. Hence, the deviation is not profitable.
We also need to check if the defined strategies form Nash equilibria in the 
subgames that follow agent z − 1 ’s deviation in period zT. As mentioned, the 
deviation will trigger part 3b in period zT + 1 . Only agent z can unilaterally change 
this outcome. First, it is easy to verify that he cannot gain by misreporting his type, 
that is, it is always optimal to announce 휓z = 휃z once parts 3 and 4 of the regime are 
triggered. (Note that whenever 휓z matters for the selection of alternative, the selected 
alternative is a(휓z) .) Second, by announcing a different integer, he can trigger part 
3c, in which case, given others’ strategies, he expects the outcome corresponding to 
part 4b in the next period. Again, it is easy to verify that agent z does not gain from 
such a deviation.
Also, we can check that no profitable deviation exists from part 4b. Only agent 
i can unilaterally change the outcome and only to part 4c. Since his true type was 
announced, 휂i = 휃i , in period zT, he prefers a(휂i,휙i) to b(휂i,휙i) for any 휙i ≠ 휂i . 
Therefore, the deviation to part 4c is not profitable. Finally, no profitable deviation 
exists after any other history simply because the outcome of the regime does not 
depend on the messages that are sent after these other histories.
In the remainder of the proof, we will argue that there do not exist undesirable 
equilibria. Suppose that in an equilibrium, the agents have been sending unanimous, 
but possibly untruthful messages up to some period zT. Also suppose that period 
zT messages fall under part 1c. We will now analyse what are the equilibrium 
outcomes of the subgame that follows these messages. That is, suppose that 
period t = zT  messages are mt
k
= (휂z−2, 휂z−1, 휂z, ⋅) for all k ∈ Nt�{z − 1} while 
mt
z−1
= (휙z−2,휙z−1,휙z, ⋅) ≠ (휂z−2, 휂z−1, 휂z, ⋅) . Assume first that 휙z−2,휙z−1,휙z are the 
true types of agents z − 2, z − 1, z.
Suppose part 4 is reached in period zT + 2 . There is an equilibrium that falls 
under part 4a, in which everyone announces 0. There cannot be an equilibrium 
falling under part 4b: by assumption, 휙i is the true type of agent i. Therefore, he 
prefers b(휂i,휙i) to a(휂i,휙i) and will deviate to trigger part 4c. Neither there can 
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be an equilibrium falling under part 4c because a(휂z−1) ≠ a(휂z−1) and agent 
k ∈ {z − 1, z}�{i} is better off by triggering part 4d. Finally, since the integer game 
does not have an equilibrium, there cannot be an equilibrium falling under part 4d. 
It follows that if part 4 is reached, the unique equilibrium outcome corresponds to 
part 4a.
Consider now period zT + 1 and part 3 of the regime. There is an equilibrium that 
falls under part 3a, in which everyone announces 0. There cannot be an equilibrium 
falling under part 3b because agent z is better off by announcing his true type, 
휓z = 휙z , and triggering part 3c as he expects the outcome corresponding to part 4a 
in period zT + 2 . Neither there can be an equilibrium falling under part 3c because 
a(휂z−1) ≠ a(휂z−1) and agent z − 1 would prefer to deviate and trigger part 3d. Finally, 
there cannot be an equilibrium falling under part 3d. To summarize, if other agents 
misreport the type of at least one of the agents z − 2, z − 1, z in period zT, then agent 
z − 1 , by announcing the true types of agents z − 2, z − 1, z , can secure his most 
preferred outcome from period zT + 1 onwards (without affecting the outcome of 
period zT).
Assume now that period zT messages still fall under part 1c, but agent z − 1 
does not announce the true type of at least one of the agents z − 2, z − 1, z . It 
is still true that in the subgame that follows, parts 3d and 4d cannot be played on 
the equilibrium path. Part 3c also cannot be played on the equilibrium path: if it is 
triggered, period zT + 2 messages will fall under one of the parts 4a-4c. But then, 
since a(휂z−1) ≠ a(휂z−1) , agent z − 1 does not obtain his best outcome starting period 
zT + 1 and is better off by triggering part 3d. Thus, only parts 3a and 3b can possibly 
be played in equilibrium after agent z − 1 triggers 1c.
Given the above conclusions, we now argue that the only possible equilibria are 
in unanimous messages, that is, only part 1a is played in any equilibrium. Clearly, 
period zT messages cannot fall under part 2. Neither they can fall under part 1c: 
from the previous analysis, we know that either part 3a or 3b will be played in the 
continuation. However, agent z then is better off by triggering part 2. Suppose now 
that period zT messages fall under part 1b. In this case, neither agent z − 2 , nor agent 
z − 1 obtains his best alternative in every period. Therefore, depending whether their 
types are misreported in period (z − 1)T  or in zT, either agent z − 2 will deviate in 
period (z − 1)T  or agent z − 1 will deviate in period zT to part 1c by announcing the 
true types and will expect part 3a to be played in the next period, giving him his 
most preferred outcome.20 Thus, part 1b also cannot be played in equilibrium. It 
follows that the only equilibria are in unanimous messages.
It remains to argue that the unanimous messages must be truthful in any equilib-
rium. From the previous analysis, we know that agent z, by triggering part 1c, can 
secure his most preferred outcome from period (z + 1)T + 1 onwards when others 
lie about the types of agents z − 1, z, z + 1 in period (z + 1)T  . We only need to show 
that in any potential equilibrium with unanimous, but untruthful messages, there 
always exists some agent z who does not expect his maximal payoff from period 
20 This is the only instance in the proof where we need that agent z − 1 can trigger part 1c by challenging 
the type of agent z.
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(z + 1)T + 1 onwards and, hence, has the incentives to deviate. Note that it is equiva-
lent to saying that the agent does not expect his maximal payoff from period (z + 1)T  
on because the alternative that is specified by an SCF, does not change during peri-
ods (z + 1)T ,… , (z + 2)T − 1 . That there exists such an agent is proven in the fol-
lowing claim.
Claim 1 Suppose there exists an equilibrium in unanimous but untruthful messages. 
Then, with a strictly positive probability, there exists an agent, say, agent z and a 
type of this agent, say, 휙 such that in the equilibrium, this agent expects less than 
his maximal possible payoff of (n − 1)Tu(a(휙),휙) from period (z + 1)T  on and the 
agents misreport either the type of agent z − 1 , z, or z + 1.
Proof of Claim 1 Consider an equilibrium in unanimous but untruthful messages.
Because the premises of Condition C1 are empty, either there is no a ∈ A that 
is the best alternative for all types, or there is no sequence of types 휃0, 휃1,… such 
that f (휃z,… , 휃z+n−1) = a for all z ∈ ℤ . We will consider each of these two cases 
separately.
Suppose first there does not exist a ∈ A that is the best alternative for all types. 
Suppose that the agents in period zT lie about the true type, say, 휙 of agent z. Then, 
they must also lie about his type in periods (z + 1)T  and (z + 2)T  . If this agent does 
not receive his maximal payoff from period (z + 1)T  on, we are done with the claim. 
If he receives the maximal payoff, it must be that alternative a(휙) is implemented 
in every period starting with period (z + 1)T  . But by the assumption, there exists a 
type of agent z + 1 for whom a(휙) is not the best alternative. Since n ≥ 3 , this agent 
does not get his maximal payoff from period (z + 2)T  on, which again establishes 
the claim.
Suppose now that there exists a ∈ A that is the best alternative for all 
types, but there does not exist an infinite sequence of types 휃0, 휃1,… such that 
f (휃z,… , 휃z+n−1) = a for all z ∈ ℤ . Let 휙0,휙1,… denote the true types and 휃0, 휃1,… 
denote the reported types of agents 0, 1,… . Suppose that 휃z ≠ 휙z , but agent z expects 
the maximal possible payoff from period (z + 1)T  on, that is, alternative a is imple-
mented (at least) during periods (z + 1)T ,… , (z + n)T − 1 . We claim that there 
exists a profile of types (휙z+1,… ,휙z+n−1) ∈ Θn−1 such that the type of at least one 
of the agents among z + 1,… , z + n − 1 is misreported. Suppose not. Then, it must 
be that f (휃z,휙z+1,… ,휙z+n−1) = a for all (휙z+1,… ,휙z+n−1) ∈ Θn−1 . But this contra-
dicts the assumption that there does not exist an infinite sequence of types 휃0, 휃1,… 
such that f (휃k,… , 휃k+n−1) = a for all k ∈ ℤ : if every agent, irrespective of his true 
type, reported that his type is 휃z , the alternative a would be selected forever. Thus, 
there exists a realization of types 휙z+1,… ,휙z+n−1 such that the type of some agent 
among z + 1,… , z + n − 1 is misreported. Pick this agent (if there exist several, then 
pick the one with the highest index), and repeat now the above argument for this 
agent. Since we have assumed that there does not exist an infinite sequence of types 
휃0, 휃1,… that would allow the agents to obtain alternative a forever, ultimately there 
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must be an agent k whose type is misreported and who does not receive his highest 
possible payoff from period (k + 1)T  on. This completes the proof of the claim.   ◻
To conclude, in any potential equilibrium with unanimous, but untruthful messages, 
there always exists an agent who has incentives to deviate.21 Hence, the only equilib-
ria are in unanimous and truthful messages. Consequently, the desired alternatives 
will always be selected on the equilibrium path.   ◻
Proof of Theorem  2 Suppose there exists a regime that repeatedly implements f in 
SPE. Let s be an SPE. Given s, we are going to construct another strategy profile 
s′ that also forms an SPE for sufficiently large T and that results in undesirable 
outcomes.
We start by defining the deceptions that the agents will use. Since f satis-
fies Assumption A4, there exist types ?̂?1 , (?̂?2,… , ?̂?n) , and (𝜃2,… , 𝜃n) such that 
u(f (?̂?1, 𝜃2 … , 𝜃n), ?̂?1) > u(f (?̂?1, ?̂?2,… , ?̂?n), ?̂?1) . (Note that we maintain Assumption 
A1.) Let deception 훾 be defined as follows: 𝛾(?̂?1, ?̂?2,… , ?̂?n) = (?̂?1, 𝜃2… , 𝜃n) and 
훾(휃1, 휃2,… , 휃n) = (휃1, 휃2,… , 휃n) for all (𝜃1, 𝜃2,… , 𝜃n) ≠ (?̂?1, ?̂?2,… , ?̂?n) . Note that 
u1(f◦𝛾) > u1(f ) holds. Also, since f is not weakly generation-efficient in the range, 
there exists 훿 ∈ Δ such that ∑i
j=1
uj(f◦𝛿) >
∑i
j=1
uj(f ) for all i ∈ N . We initially 
assume that 훿 is a deterministic deception and we discuss the case of random decep-
tion at the end.
Following Smith (1992), we refer to T periods from zT to (z + 1)T − 1 for any 
z ∈ ℤ as an overlap. We divide each overlap into two parts: the first Q periods and 
the remaining T − Q periods. During the first Q periods, the agents who are alive 
during that overlap, will deceive according to 훿 , while during the last T − Q periods, 
the agents deceive according to 훾 , which rewards agent 1. (Note that even though 
agent 1 gains ex ante from both deceptions, he can be worse off for some realized 
profile of types when the agents deceive according to 훿 .) Thus, let 휃t = (휃t
1
,… , 휃t
n
) 
be the profile of types in period t. Then, the period t deception is: 휋(휃t) = 훿(휃t) if 
t mod T < Q and 휋(휃t) = 훾(휃t) otherwise.
The histories of types and messages are defined similar to before: 휁0 = 휃0 and 
휁t = (휁t−1, 휃
t−1) for t > 0 , and 휇t = (휇t−1,mt−1) with 휇0 = � , where mt are period t 
messages.22 The period t history is (휁t,휇t).
We are now ready to define the strategies s′ , but first we provide a verbal descrip-
tion. The agents play according to s, but they deceive according to 휋 . That is, if their 
true types are 휃 , they act as if their types were 휋(휃) . They will do so as long as no 
deviation has occurred. If there is ever a deviation, then the agents start conditioning 
s on their true types, but they still behave as if the types that were drawn before the 
(first) deviation, were the ones given by the deception. Said differently, s depends 
on the history of types. We identify the first period when a deviation has occurred. 
Then, when conditioning s on the history of types, the types before the deviation are 
22 The types of agents −n + 1,… ,−1 before period 0 are irrelevant and, therefore, omitted.
21 From the proof of Claim 1, it follows that to eliminate unanimous, but untruthful messages, it is 
enough if agent z − 1 can trigger part 1c by challenging the types of agents z − 2 and z − 1 . Contrast it 
with Footnote 20.
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obtained by applying 휋 to the true types, while the types after the deviation corre-
spond to the true types.
We define s′ recursively with the help of a couple of auxiliary variables. Let 
휁 �
0
= 휋(휃0) and d(휁0,휇0) = 1 . The period 0 strategies are s�(휁0,휇0) = s(휁 �0,휇0) . Also, 
let d(휁1,휇1) = d(휁0,휇0) ⋅ ퟏ{s�(휁0,휇0)=s(휁 �0,휇0)} , where ퟏ{E} is an indicator function taking 
value 1 if E is true and 0 otherwise. In period 1, if d(휁1,휇1) = 1 , then 휁 �1 = (휁 �0,휋(휃1)) ; 
otherwise, 휁 �
1
= (휁 �
0
, 휃1) . Let s�(휁1,휇1) = s(휁 �1,휇1) and 
d(휁2,휇2) = d(휁1,휇1) ⋅ ퟏ{s�(휁1,휇1)=s(휁 �1,휇1)}
 . Suppose we have defined the variables up to 
period t − 1 . In period t, if d(휁t,휇t) = 1 , then 휁 �t = (휁 �t−1,휋(휃t)) ; otherwise, 
휁 �
t
= (휁 �
t−1
, 휃t) . Let s�(휁t,휇t) = s(휁 �t ,휇t) and d(휁t+1,휇t+1) = d(휁t,휇t) ⋅ ퟏ{s�(휁t ,휇t)=s(휁 �t ,휇t)}.We make a couple of observations. First, suppose we are in period t and a 
deviation from s′ has occurred in one of the previous periods, that is, d(휁t,휇t) = 0 . 
Then, since past types do not affect current or future payoffs, by construction, 
s′ imply Nash equilibrium play from that point on. Thus, we only need to verify 
whether nobody has incentives to deviate from s′ on the equilibrium path, that is, 
when d(휁t,휇t) = 1 for some t. Second, suppose we are in period t, no deviation from 
s′ has occurred so far, and the history is (휁t,휇t) . Suppose an agent is contemplating 
a deviation. Then, clearly, the period t outcomes and the continuation payoffs from 
period t + 1 onwards that this agent can induce by deviating are exactly the same that 
he can induce by deviating from s after history (휁 �
t
,휇t).
In the remaining analysis, all that matters is which period of the overlap we 
consider. Therefore, t will now only take values in {1,… , T} . Thus, agent n is born 
at the beginning of period 1, while agent 1 dies at the end of period T. Occasionally, 
it will be convenient to refer to agent i + 1 in period T as agent i in period 0.
If agent i ∈ N deviates in period t ∈ {1,… , T} , then besides the period t 
payoff, he also expects a continuation payoff from the next period onwards. For 
the comparison purposes, it will be convenient to write this continuation payoff as 
(iT − t)v . That is, after the deviation, agent i will still live for (iT − t) periods. Hence, 
v is the average, ex ante, per-period payoff during these (iT − t) periods.
We need to prove that nobody wants to deviate from s′ on the equilibrium path. 
We will first show that agent 1 does not want to deviate during periods Q + 1,… , T  . 
Next, we will show that he also does not have incentives to deviate in periods 
1,… ,Q when T − Q is sufficiently large. Finally, we will show that any agent i > 1 
also does not want to deviate in periods 1,… , T  for sufficiently large Q.
Claim 2 Agent 1 has no incentives to deviate during periods Q + 1,… , T .
Proof of Claim 2 The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there is t ∈ {Q + 1,… , T} 
and a history with period t state (휃1, 휃2,… , 휃n) when agent 1 has incentives to devi-
ate. Note that during periods Q + 1,… , T  , the agents deceive according to 훾 . Thus, 
there exist an alternative a and a continuation payoff (T − t)v that agent 1 can obtain 
by deviating, such that the following inequality holds:
u(f◦𝛾(𝜃1, 𝜃2,… , 𝜃n), 𝜃1) + (T − t)u1(f◦𝛾) < u(a, 𝜃1) + (T − t)v.
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The above inequality is still true if we replace u1(f◦훾) with u1(f ) . But as noted 
before, we can find a history when the agents follow strategies s such that the true 
period t state is 훾(휃1, 휃2,… , 휃n) and agent 1 can obtain the same a and (T − t)v by 
deviating from s. Since the agents do not lie about the type of agent 1 under 훾 , it 
follows then from the above inequality (with u1(f◦훾) replaced by u1(f ) ) that agent 1 
also has a profitable deviation from s, which contradicts the assumption that s is an 
SPE.   ◻
To prove the following two claims, our approach will be as follows. When 
considering a deviation by some agent in some period, we will lower-bound the 
payoff that he expects from following the strategy, and we will upper-bound the 
payoff that he expects from deviating from that strategy, and we will show that the 
former payoff is higher than the latter for sufficiently large T. When we lower-bound 
agent’s payoff, we can assume that his current period payoff is u = inf(a,휃)∈A×Θ u(a, 휃) , 
irrespective of the actual state of the world. Similarly, when we upper-bound agent’s 
payoff, we can assume that his current period payoff is u = sup(a,휃)∈A×Θ u(a, 휃) , again 
irrespective of the actual state of the world. For this reason, we can ignore what is 
the actual state of the world, when analysing the incentives to deviate.
Also, for the following claims, we need an upper-bound on the continuation 
payoff (iT − t)v that agent i can obtain by deviating in period t. We use the fact that 
s is an SPE. Thus, suppose agent i deviates from s in period t and state (휃1,… , 휃n) 
and, as a result, period t outcome is alternative a and this agent expects (iT − t)v in 
the continuation. Since s is SPE, this deviation cannot be profitable:
Since we want to upper-bound (iT − t)v , we set u(f (휃1,… , 휃n), 휃i) = u and 
u(a, 휃i) = u . Hence, the upper-bound on the continuation payoff from any deviation, 
in any state, for any i and t is given by
We will use this expression in the continuation.
Claim 3 For sufficiently large T − Q , agent 1 has no incentives to deviate during 
periods 1,… ,Q.
Proof of Claim 3 Since u1(f◦𝛿) > u1(f ) holds, it is easy to see that if agent 1 does not 
have incentives to deviate in period Q, then he also has no incentives to deviate in 
periods t ∈ {1,… ,Q − 1} . Hence, we focus on period t = Q . His worst payoff from 
sticking to the deception, whatever is the state of the world, is
u(f (휃1,… , 휃n), 휃i) + T
i∑
j=1
uj(f ) − tui(f ) ≥ u(a, 휃i) + (iT − t)v.
(1)(iT − t)v ≤ u − u + T
i∑
j=1
uj(f ) − tui(f ).
u + (T − Q)u1(f◦훾),
 H. Āzacis 
1 3
while his payoff from any deviation can be upper-bounded by
where we have used (1). Thus, agent 1 has no incentives to deviate in period Q if
Since u1(f◦𝛾) > u1(f ) , we can find T − Q such that the above inequality is indeed 
satisfied.   ◻
Claim 4 For sufficiently large Q, no agent i > 1 has incentives to deviate during 
periods 1,… , T .
Proof of Claim 4 Consider any agent i > 1 . Agent i’s decision in which period to 
deviate, depends on the relative magnitudes of ui(f◦훿) , ui(f◦훾) , and ui(f ) . Con-
sider first the periods t = 1,… ,Q . If ui(f◦𝛿) > ui(f ) , then the agent will want to 
benefit from the deception 훿 as long as possible and if he decides to deviate, then 
it will be in period Q. (More precisely, if the agent has incentives to deviate for 
any t ∈ {1,… ,Q} , then he necessarily has incentives to deviate in period Q.) If 
ui(f◦𝛿) < ui(f ) , then the agent will want to deviate as soon as possible. It is con-
venient to set the period when the agent deviates as period 0, which is equivalent 
to agent i + 1 deviating in period T. Now, consider the periods t = Q + 1,… , T  . If 
ui(f◦𝛾) > ui(f ) , then the agent will want to benefit from the deception 훾 as long as 
possible and if he decides to deviate, then it will be in period T or, equivalently, 
period 0 for agent i − 1 . If ui(f◦𝛾) < ui(f ) , then the agent will want to deviate as soon 
as possible, that is, in period Q. To sum up, we only need to consider two periods 
when an agent i decides to deviate: periods 0 and Q.
Consider t = 0 . The worst payoff to agent i from sticking to the deception, 
irrespective of the state of the world, is
while his payoff from deviating can be upper-bounded by
where we have again used (1). Since ∑i
j=1
uj(f◦𝛿) >
∑i
j=1
uj(f ) , then for a fixed 
T − Q , we can always find Q such that the payoff from following the deception 
exceeds the one from the deviation. The case for t = Q is similar and, therefore, 
omitted.  ◻
To summarize, we can always find T − Q and Q and, hence, T large enough, so 
that no agent has incentives to deviate from the deception 훿 for the first Q periods, 
u + (T − Q)v ≤ 2u − u + (T − Q)u1(f ),
u + (T − Q)u1(f◦훾) ≥ 2u − u + (T − Q)u1(f ).
u + Q
i∑
j=1
uj(f◦훿) + (T − Q)
i∑
j=1
uj(f◦훾),
u + iTv ≤ 2u − u + Q
i∑
j=1
uj(f ) + (T − Q)
i∑
j=1
uj(f )
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followed by the deception 훾 for the remaining T − Q periods in each overlap. That 
is, no agent has incentives to deviate from s′ . Hence, f is not implemented.
Finally, if 훿 is a random deception, then we can always construct a sequence 
of deterministic deceptions that on average give almost the same payoff as 
훿 . More precisely, if ∑i
j=1
uj(f◦𝛿) >
∑i
j=1
uj(f ) for all i ∈ N and some 훿 ∈ Δ , 
then there exist 훿1,… , 훿R for some R such that 훿l ∈ D for all l = 1,… ,R and ∑R
l=1
∑i
j=1
uj(f◦𝛿l) > R
∑i
j=1
uj(f ) for all i ∈ N . Arguments similar to the above 
ones can be used to show that we can always find T − QR and Q and, hence, T 
large enough, so that no agent has incentives to deviate when in each overlap, the 
agents first deceive Q times according to 훿1,… , 훿R for QR periods in total and 
then according to 훾 for the remaining T − QR periods.   ◻
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